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Do Your Job: Judicial Review of
Occupational Licensing in the Face of
Economic Protectionism
Despite efforts to challenge certain occupational licensing
schemes as impermissibly driven by naked economic protectionism,
federal appellate courts disagree on the legitimacy owed to the
protectionist motivations that commonly prompt these regulations. To
eliminate the current confusion, this Note advocates for the application
of rational-basis-with-judicial-engagement review. The Supreme Court
has demonstrated a willingness to engage in such analysis before-in
both its animus jurisprudence over the past decades and more recently
in its meticulous cost-benefit inquiry in Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt-thereby weakening its claims of incompetence in
evaluating the motivations of lawmakers. To avoid hindering the
economic wellbeing of all Americans, the Court should do its job in order
to protect your right to do yours.
INTRODUCTION ....................................... ...... 1664
I. CHALLENGING LICENSING REQUIREMENTS:
THEN AND Now ...................................... 1668
A. The Phantom of the Lochner Era........................... 1669
B. The Circuit Split: Is Economic Protectionism
a Legitimate State Interest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 1674
1. Casketing Economic Protectionism:
Fifth and Sixth Circuits ................ 1674
2. Resuscitating Economic Protectionism:
Second and Tenth Circuits .............. 1676
3. Don't Thread on Me: A Treatise
on Economic Liberty ................... 1678
II. UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALES FOR AND THE JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS................... 1679
A. Neither the Public Choice nor for the Public Good:
Understanding Occupational Licensing Through
Public Choice Theory ........................ 1680
B. "An Unworkable Morass": The Current State of the
Court's Tiers of Scrutiny..................... 1684
1663
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
C. Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny: Heightened Review
as a Non Sequitur ...................... 1686
III. THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW: JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 1688
A. Rational Basis-with-Judicial-Engagement ........... 1689
1. Detecting Illicit Motives: The Court's Animus
Jurisprudence .................... 1690
2. Demonstrating Ability to Balance Interests:
Whole Woman's Health ........ ......... 1695
B. Application: The Benefits and Burdens of Shampooing
in Tennessee .......................... ..... 1696
CONCLUSION ............................................... 1699
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you already hold a full-time job but want to earn some
extra money by working at your friend's hair salon in downtown
Nashville. The salon owner offers you a job shampooing clients before
she cuts their hair. Just before starting, however, you learn that the
State of Tennessee will not let you shampoo hair without a shampoo
technician license from the state Board of Cosmetology.' Yet to acquire
a shampoo technician license, you must complete three hundred hours
in the "practice and theory of shampooing" at a certified cosmetology
school, a thought even more troubling for your financial wellbeing.2
What is the likelihood that you will incur the expense and undertake
the effort to get the required licensing for this part-time side job? Slim
to none.3 Alternatively, what is the likelihood that you will successfully
be able to lobby the state legislature to change this burdensome and
arbitrary licensing law that is keeping you from working, particularly
in light of your busy schedule due to your primary full-time job? Next
to zero.4
Unfortunately, Tennessee's "shampoo technician" license
typifies only one of dozens of occupational licensing laws that state
legislatures enact in the name of consumer safety or public health,
1. BD. OF COSMETOLOGY & BARBER EXAMINERS, Shampoo Technician, TENN. DEP'T COM. &
INS., https://www.tn.gov/commerce/article/cosmo-shampoo-technician (last visited July 9, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/9Y6C-AZFE].
2. Id.
3. See MORRIS M. KLEINER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT: REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING POLICIES 6 (2015) ("[S]tudies have ... shown that licensing reduces employment
growth and limits job opportunities, especially for low-income individuals .... .").
4. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 50 ("[Tjhe scattered individuals who are denied access to an
occupation by State-enforced barriers are about as impotent a minority as can be imagined.").
1664 [Vol. 70:5:1663
2017] DO YOUR JOB 1665
many of which nonetheless unjustifiably burden the economic liberties
of Americans to earn a living.5 Specifically, the onerous requirements of
occupational licensing tend to disproportionately burden racial
minorities and the poor.6 While certain licensing requirements
generally do serve the important purpose of protecting public health
and safety7-particularly for occupations in the medical or legal field
that entail large information asymmetries8-the growth of licensing
laws and the professions they regulate has entered the r alm of the
absurd.9 Requiring government permission to lather and rinse
another's hair-a task that virtually every American does every single
day-is ludicrous.10 With only arguably dubious connections to public
health and safety, states now regulate and require licensing for interior
designers," florists,12 lightning rod installers,13 eyebrow threaders,14
5. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 209, 216 (2016).
6. See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 6 (noting the negative economic effects of occupational
licensing requirements on low-income individuals); David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A
Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1994) (discussing how occupational licensing laws have hindered the
economic success of black Americans); James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence
with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2010) (noting that a significant number of occupational licensing
restrictions "harm those who are at the bottom of the economic pyramid"); Joseph Sanderson, Note,
Don't Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31
YALE J. ON REG. 455, 460 (2014) ("[E]ven commentators generally friendly to regulation often
criticize licensure: its burdens fall disproportionately on the economically disadvantaged . . . .").
For a different perspective on a classic constitutional law case, see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), where a San Francisco ordinance required a license from the city to run a laundry
business, with the effect of excluding all Chinese-owned laundries.
7. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 101 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J.,
concurring) ("Government understandably wants to rid society of quacks, swindlers, and
incompetents. And licensing is one of government's preferred tools, aiming to protect us from harm
by credentialing certain occupations and activities.").
8. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1566 ("In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible,
for a consumer to judge the quality of her physician or attorney, and these practitioners are
unlikely to internalize the full costs of their mistakes. Some level of state credentialing and
regulation makes sense.").
9. See id. ("No one seriously disputes the need for some form of professional regulation in
the presence of large information asymmetries and serious spillover effects." (emphasis added)).
10. See id. (recognizing numerous areas where "the need for stringent licensing requirements
and regulations seems less obvious").
11. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 481.213 (2016).
12. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3804(A)(2), 3:3809 (2017).
13. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 905 (2016).
14. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:582 (2017).
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fortune tellers,16 milk samplers,16 upholsterers,1 7 auctioneers,1 8 and
home entertainment installers,1 9 just to name a handful.20
As legislatures pass increasing numbers of licensing laws,
resulting in them becoming some of the most pervasive and ubiquitous
statutes enacted in recent years,2 1 occupational licensing laws thus
offer a prime lens through which to analyze economic regulations more
broadly and the standards of review to which they are subjected.22
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of the historical context of
judicial review of potentially economic protectionist occupational
licensing during the Lochner Era and its aftermath, including a brief
examination of the current oversight to which "merely" economic
regulations, such as occupational licensing, are subjected. It then
dissects the current division among the circuit courts regarding
whether economic protectionism, without something more, is a
legitimate state interest for purposes of rational basis review.
Next, Part II addresses the underpinnings of these occupational
regulations through the lens of public choice theory. Less than altruistic
motives drive the passage of many of these regulatory schemes, and
some are indeed passed with naked economic protectionism in mind.23
Economic protectionism is typically described as a restraint on trade,
commerce, or competition designed to benefit a particular group or
industry.24 Because the mere presence of economic protectionism
suggests a potential breakdown of the political process, otherwise
voiceless individuals can instead seek relief from overly burdensome
regulations through the judiciary. Section II.B elaborates on the
blurring of the traditional tiers of scrutiny used by the judiciary over
15. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 1851 (2016).
16. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-30-12 (2017).
17. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 19052 (2017).
18. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-603 (2016).
19. See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 10 (listing home-entertainment installer as an occupation
for which many states require a license).
20. Larkin, supra note 5, at 216-18 (citing KLEINER, supra note 3, at 9).
21. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations
Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2014) ("Once limited to a few learned
professions, licensing is now required for over 800 occupations."); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-
Stamps into Gavels: A Fresh Look at Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J. FORuM 304, 304 (2016)
(observing that about twenty-five percent of "American workers must obtain a government-issued
license to do their job, up from less than five percent in the 1950s").
22. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing the various ways courts review occupational
licensing).
23. See id. (discussing and critiquing the rationales behind occupational licensing); infra
Section II.A.
24. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (2002) ("Courts have repeatedly




the past decades,25 and how the tiers have lacked clarity from
inception.26 More recent decisions demonstrate that the Court has
become even more opaque in explaining which test it is applying,
leaving lower courts to wonder.27 Additionally, while some
commentators have posited heightened tiers of scrutiny as possible
standards of review for economic regulations, this Part concludes with
a critique of why advocating for intermediate or strict scrutiny for these
regulations would likely subject them to excessive judicial oversight
and be too great a burden on the judicial branch,28 especially given the
prevalence of occupational licensing requirements.29
Finally, Part III of this Note proposes a solution: a new take on
rational basis-rational-basis-with-judicial-engagement review-to
address occupational licensing regulations. This type of judicial review
would empower courts to do their jobs: to engage with the record and
analyze the purported rationales that motivated the decisionmaker,
without blindly deferring to the legislature and the justifications that it
puts forward.30 Courts should not concoct their own justifications to
save an economic regulation if the government, as the party who
enacted the legislation, cannot articulate a legitimate, substantiated
rationale on its own.3 1 Instead, a court, if it suspects economic
protectionist motivations are behind the law, should practice "judicial
engagement" in examining the evidence put forth by the parties.32
25. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485-91 (2004)
(critiquing the Court's application of differing standards of review); Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and the Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence,
42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2014) (recognizing "an embarrassing degree of doctrinal
sloppiness").
26. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently adjusted the care
with which it will review state discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the
interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification.").
27. See Pollvogt, supra note 25, at 1045 (discussing the reasons for the "lack of doctrinal
consolidation" amongst lower courts); infra Section II.B.
28. James M. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483, 490-92 (1974).
29. See infra Section II.C.
30. See Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 93 (Tex. 2015) (Willett,
J., concurring) (discussing the court's role in "[i]nvalidating irrational laws"); infra Section III.A.
31. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (describing the current state
of rational basis review of economic regulations: "[Blecause [the Court] never require[s] a
legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant . . . whether the
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature"); Neily, supra
note 21, at 308 ("Blind acceptance of asserted-but unsubstantiated-justifications for
government regulation is the sine qua non of the rational basis test that the Supreme Court applies
to most occupational-licensing challenges.").
32. See Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 93-97 (discussing "judicial engagement" in the context of
occupational licensing); see also John 0. McGinnis, Reforming Constitutional Review of State
Economic Legislation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 522 (2016) (arguing that the judiciary is
particularly well suited to examine the record due to "its salient institutional structure ... the
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Naked economic protectionism, this Note argues, fails as a
legitimate government interest, specifically for purposes of rational
basis review, and therefore should trigger a more searching inquiry by
the reviewing court.33 If a challenger can produce substantial evidence
of economic protectionism, without corresponding non-trifling public
health or safety benefits, the court should strike the regulation if it
unreasonably burdens an individual's economic liberty.34 The Supreme
Court recently demonstrated that the judiciary is indeed capable of an
evenhanded and meaningful review of state legislation purportedly
enacted in the name of public health.35 Moreover, utilizing a judicial
engagement standard of review would likely prompt state legislators to
be more thoughtful in their lawmaking, thereby improving the
evidentiary record that the court reviews.
While this solution may have seemed more of a fool's errand
leading up to the 2016 presidential election, the application of rational
basis-with-judicial-engagement now appears more viable. The possible
shift to a more conservative-leaning Supreme Court favoring the idea
of judicial engagement seems plausible, making the constitutional
challenge of occupational licensing less of a Sisyphean task.
I. CHALLENGING LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: THEN AND Now
The following Part first presents a discussion of the historical
context of the Supreme Court's examination of occupational licensing
and other general economic regulations.36 With that historical context
lingering in the background, it then details the stark division that has
developed between the federal appellate courts over the past decade
adversarial proceeding where each side has incentives to scrutinize relentlessly the factual claims
of its opponent"); infra Section III.A.
33. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 285 ("Favoring groups for reasons that are unrelated to, and
do not advance, the overall public welfare should not be deemed 'legitimate' in a system devoted
to the even-handed application of the law."); Katharine M. Rudish, Note, Unearthing the Public
Interest: Recognizing Intrastate Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State Interest, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1503-04 (2012) (discussing "[w]hat constitutes a legitimate government
purpose"); infra Part III.
34. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("Thus, where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been
erected."); see also Alden F. Abbott, Raisins, Teeth, Coffins, and Economic Liberty, 10 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 130, 148-49 (2016) (arguing that recent trends point to a more expansive application
of the rational basis test "when it comes to analyzing anticompetitive licensing restrictions and
related affronts to one of the most basic civil rights of all: the right to earn a living"); infra Section
III.A.
35. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313 (2016) (evaluating the
reasons purportedly motivating a Texas statute restricting the number of abortion facilities in the
state); infra Section III.A.2.
36. See infra Section I.A.
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with regard to whether pure economic protectionism, without
something more, constitutes a legitimate government interest.37
Additionally, this Part evaluates a well-publicized case decided by the
Supreme Court of Texas and the resulting treatise on economic
liberty.38
A. The Phantom of the Lochner Era39
The names of only a handful of cases in the history of American
jurisprudence reek of notoriety, and "Lochner" is one of them.40
According to the typical understanding of the case, Lochner v. New York
is easily dismissed as a clear-cut example of the Court exceeding its
authority and inappropriately acting as a "super-legislature" in striking
a piece of economic legislation.41 Consequently, "[slince the New Deal
Era, the Court had largely treated Lochner like the plague."42 However,
what if the true story behind Lochner is more complicated than it
appears at first glance?43
The law at issue in Lochner, the New York Bakeshop Act of 1895,
limited the working hours in bakeries to ten hours per day and sixty
hours per week.44 In defending the law, the State justified the
limitations on hours worked as a protection for bakers' health.45 Still,
in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that this limitation on
37. See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.
38. See infra Section I.B.3.
39. Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
314, 315 (2016) ("Often called the Lochner Era, that period from the end of the Gilded Age through
much of the Great Depression has come to symbolize the judicial striking down of economic
regulation.").
40. See Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York- Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 405 (2005) ("The decision is commonly ranked along with Dred Scott
as a prime example of judicial malfunctioning and as the most discredited decision in Supreme
Court history."); Ian Millhiser, The Most Incompetent Branch, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 507, 510-
11 (2016) ("Short of Dred Scott v. Sanford or Plessy v. Ferguson, there is literally no decision in
American history that is less rooted in accepted legal traditions than Lochner."); Casey C. Sullivan,
13 Worst Supreme Court Decisions of All Time, FINDLAW (Oct. 14, 2015, 11:51 AM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/supremecourt/2015/10/13-worst-supreme-court-decisions-of-all-
time.html [https://perma.ce/S37Z-QWMU] (naming Lochner v. New York as one of the "most
terrible, horrible, no good, very bad Supreme Court decisions").
41. Neily, supra note 21, at 306 (describing Lochner as a "one-word argument against robust
judicial review . .. more than a century later").
42. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Tale of Two Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 471 (2016).
43. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 125 (2011) (suggesting that "Lochner and liberty of
contract jurisprudence more generally have been unfairly maligned. . ."); see also infra Section
II.A.
44. See Kens, supra note 40, at 409 (explaining the specific provisions of the New York
Bakeshop Act of 1895 and the legislative history surrounding its passage).
45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59-61 (1905).
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working hours unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom to
contract, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.46 Because "the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an
unhealthy one," the Court reasoned, the New York state legislature
possessed no authority to "interfere with the right to labor" in such a
way.4 7 However, the Lochner Court did not fully investigate the
rationales proffered by the State for the regulations,48 instead flatly
invalidating the law without necessarily considering the interests
served by the legislation.49
After more than three decades under the reign of Lochner, the
Court signaled its move away from the fervent protection of economic
due process with its endorsement of a minimum wage law for women in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.50 Refusing to pay a chambermaid the
difference between the wages already paid to her and the minimum
wage fixed by law,5 1 a hotel operator in the State of Washington then
challenged the state's minimum wage law for women as
unconstitutional and violative of his due process rights.52 The State
defended the law as necessary to shield "women and minors . .. from
conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their health and
morals,"53 and the Court agreed.54 The freedom to contract was not
absolute,55 the Court suggested, but in fact, the legislature "has
necessarily a wide field of discretion" in passing measures to protect
worker health and safety and ensure "wholesome conditions of work."56
Notably, however, while the Court approved restrictions on the freedom
46. Id. at 53.
47. Id. at 59.
48. But see id. at 70-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing in detail the maladies that
afflicted bakers at the time as a result of their occupation, which could have served as the impetus
for the law at issue); Millhiser, supra note 40, at 518-19 (elaborating on the working conditions of
bakeries in New York City at the time of Lochner).
49. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 (1987) (explaining that the
justices of the Lochner Era grew up in an America ignorant of "large-scale industrial organization,
urban squalor, and the helplessness of the individual in dealing with organized wealth").
50. Compare Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (striking a minimum wage
law for women and children working in the District of Columbia), with W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding the State of Washington's minimum wage law for women and
overruling Adkins).
51. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 388.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 386 (citing language from Washington's Minimum Wages for Women Act).
54. Id. at 393 (detailing other state statutes regulating contracts between employer and
employee that the Supreme Court had already upheld).
55. Id. at 391 ("The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation,
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.").
56. Id. at 399 ("Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects
uncertain, still the Legislature is entitled to its judgment.").
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to contract between employers and employees, it also emphasized that
this was a minimum wage law applicable only to women, "in whose
protection the state has a special interest."5 7
By 1938, however, the Court had fully changed course and
abandoned the full-throated protection of the freedom to contract and
economic due process with its decision in United States v. Carolene
Products.5 8 The issue in Carolene Products implicated the Filled Milk
Act of 1923, a federal statute proscribing the shipment of so-called
"filled" milk, or skimmed milk combined with a non-milk fat to resemble
milk or cream.59 Despite Congress's urging that the law was intended
to protect the public from "adulterated . . . food, injurious to the public
health,"60 a manufacturer of the cheaper milk alternative challenged
the law as an unconstitutional violation of due process rights.61 This
time, however, the Court was not persuaded.62 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stone drove the final nail into Lochner's coffin, admonishing the
challengers that
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.6 3
Although not part of the Court's official holding, another result
of the Court's decision in Carolene Products was its "Famous Footnote
Four," which recognized the existence of particular instances in which
the presumption of constitutionality would be inapplicable and where
57. Id. at 394.
58. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
59. 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (2012). Interestingly, even in 2017, the Filled Milk Act still remains a
valid, though unenforced, part of the U.S. Code. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story ofCarolene
Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 426 ("After a period of relatively vigorous enforcement, the
executive branches of the state and federal governments grew lax about prosecuting violations of
the filled milk statutes [and the] Department of Agriculture eviscerated the federal statute
through interpretation. . . ."). Many of the canned milk products widely available today in grocery
stores across the country are manufactured and sold notwithstanding the prohibition against
them.
60. § 62. But see Miller, supra note 59, at 406 (detailing the history of the Filled Milk Act of
1923 and clarifying that in actuality, "filled milk" was "simply a compound of skimmed milk and
vegetable oil").
61. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146-47.
62. Id. at 154. For alternative explanations for why the Supreme Court changed course, see,
for example, BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEw DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
63. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
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the law would be "subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny,"64
including in cases involving discrete and insular minorities. Indeed, the
Court's later reliance on tiers of scrutiny to justify decisions originated
in "Footnote Four."65
Rational basis review sits on the lowest rung of the Court's tiers
of scrutiny. Employed for any law or regulation deemed "merely
economic," rational basis review invariably ends with the reviewing
court upholding the law, with few exceptions.66
For the purposes of traditional rational basis review, courts
typically conduct the following two-part inquiry: (1) Is there a
legitimate government interest, and (2) does the law in question bear a
rational relation to that legitimate state purpose?67 For a caricature of
this lenient standard, one need only look to the Supreme Court's
rationale in Railway Express v. New York.68 There, a New York City
ordinance forbade the operation of certain types of "advertising
vehicles," purportedly as a public safety measure aimed at preventing
distraction to vehicle drivers and pedestrians.69 Despite failing to
address "even greater [distractions] in a different category, such as the
vivid displays on Times Square," the law passed constitutional muster,
64. Id. at 152 n.4:
There may be [a] narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution . . . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny . . .. Nor
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities [or] whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry. (internal citations omitted);
see also Dana Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test-Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 373, 375 (2016) (noting that "Footnote Four" clarifies that "certain rights ... would receive
real judicial scrutiny, while all others would be reviewed under the nascent rational-basis test").
65. See Alexandra L. Klein, Note, The Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling: Applying
Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 424 (2016)
(" 'Footnote Four' has since become famous as the place where the Supreme Court established
rational basis review as the standard for economic legislation and paved the way for tiers of judicial
review.").
66. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding a statute
regarding licensing for visual care). But see Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 290
(2d Cir. 2015) (Droney, J., concurring) ("If even the deferential limits on state action fall away
simply because the regulation in question is economic, then it seems that we are not applying any
review, but only disingenuously repeating a shibboleth.").
67. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) ("To withstand
equal protection review, legislation . . . must be rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.").
68. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
69. Id. at 109.
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according to the Court, because it had a "relation to the purpose for
which it [was] made."7 0
Six years later, the Court again demonstrated its penchant for
extremely deferential review of economic regulations in Williamson v.
Lee Optical, where an Oklahoma statute prohibited any individual not
licensed as an optometrist or ophthalmologist from selling or replacing
eyeglasses without a prescription.71 Acknowledging that the law "may
exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases," Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, nevertheless declined to further investigate
the rationales behind the law.7 2 Instead, the Court speculated about the
various possibilities that may have motivated the state legislature,
settling on the state's interest in encouraging visits to the eye doctor for
the "detection of latent ailments or diseases" as a sufficient
justification.73 Notably, however, the Court did not address economic
protectionism and has not given its blessing to naked economic
protectionism as a legitimate state interest, in Lee Optical or since.
The Court's approach in Railway Express and Lee Optical
epitomizes the most deferential, borderline-lackadaisical, method of
review, and consequently these case names are commonly used as
shorthand for this hands-off approach to judicial scrutiny.74 As Justice
Douglas emphasized in Lee Optical, "[F]or protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."75
Moreover, both Railway Express and Lee Optical exemplify typical
iterations of the Supreme Court's review of what it deems to be "merely
economic" regulations, including occupational licensing laws.
70. Id. at 109-10. But see id. at 117 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While I do not think highly of
this type of regulation, that is not my business . . . .").
71. The law had the (perhaps intended) effect of putting opticians-non-doctor "artisans
qualified to grind lenses, fill prescriptions, and fit frames"-out of business, while requiring
consumers to obtain a prescription before having their eyeglasses repaired or refitted. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. at 484-86.
72. Id. at 488 ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought.").
73. Id. at 487.
74. See Clark Neily, Litigation Without Adjudication: Why the Modern Rational Basis Test Is
Unconstitutional, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 537, 542 (2016) (noting that Lee Optical "has become
a shorthand way of referring to the rubber-stamp form of rational basis review").
75. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)); see infra Section
II.A. This tacit separation of powers argument typifies the thinking behind courts' and judges'
reluctance to engage in meaningful judicial review of economic regulations.
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B. The Circuit Split: Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate State
Interest?
Over the past decade, a distinct circuit split has developed
regarding whether naked economic protectionism, without something
more, is a legitimate government interest.76 Applying rational basis
review in assessing constitutional challenges, some circuits have
invalidated state occupational licensing requirements, while others
have upheld the regulations, notwithstanding evidence that pure
economic protectionism drove the state legislature to enact the
requirements.77 This Section summarizes the federal appellate cases on
each side of the economic protectionism schism, followed by a discussion
of the widely publicized Texas Supreme Court eyebrow threading case
that resulted in a treatise on economic liberty and judicial engagement.
1. Casketing Economic Protectionism: Fifth and Sixth Circuits
A Tennessee statute served as the impetus for the first of the
"casket cases" in Craigmiles v. Giles.78 The Tennessee Funeral Directors
and Embalmers Act ("FDEA") required that any individual engaged in
"funeral directing" be licensed as a funeral director by the Board of
Funeral Directors and Embalmers.79 However, the FDEA also included
the sale of caskets and other funeral merchandise in that definition of
funeral directing.80 In order to be eligible to sit for the Tennessee
Funeral Arts Examination, an applicant had to "undergo two years of
education and training, very little of which . . . pertains to casket design
or selection."81 As such, any individual interested in entering the
business of casket sales would first need to learn how to embalm a body
before she could simply sell the box.8 2
76. See Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that
there were "rational grounds for the Dental Commission to restrict the use of [LED] lights to
trained dentists'); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that no
rational basis existed for a rule restricting sale of caskets); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that "intrastate economic protectionism ... is a legitimate state
interest"); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a provision limiting
the sale of caskets "lacked a rational basis").
77. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 285; Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
78. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
79. Id.
80. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101 (2017) (exempting the sale of "funeral merchandise"
from the definition of "funeral directing" as a result of Craigmiles).
81. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
82. Id. ("Applicants may ... complete either one year of course work at an accredited




Forbidden from operating their businesses, Tennessee-based
casket retailers ultimately challenged the FDEA on constitutional
grounds, as violative of the Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
Remarking that "judicial invalidation of economic regulation under the
Fourteenth Amendment has been rare in the modern era," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nonetheless held the
statute to be a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 To support its holding, Judge
Boggs, writing for the unanimous panel, emphasized that " [c]ourts have
repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose"85 and
that the Tennessee law bore no rational relationship to any of the
myriad of government purposes the State proffered.8 6 Despite
acknowledging that it was applying rational basis review, the court
nevertheless delved earnestly into the effects, justifications, and actual
motivation of the law.8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
elaborated on the Craigmiles line of reasoning in its review of a similar
provision adopted in Louisiana.88 Prohibited from selling their monastic
wooden caskets by a rule of the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors,
a group of Benedictine monks challenged the Board's rule granting
funeral homes the exclusive right to sell caskets.89 Finding "no rational
relationship . . . between public health and safety and restricting
intrastate casket sales to funeral directors," the court struck the rule.90
The unanimous decision in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille articulated the
potential problems that arise from a state rule untethered to a
"constitutionally permissible objective"91 and held that "mere economic
protection of a particular industry" is not a legitimate governmental
purpose.92 Notwithstanding the general deference given to legislatures
83. Id. at 223.
84. Id. at 229.
85. Id. at 224 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("Thus,
where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected.")).
86. Id. at 228.
87. Id. at 227 (referencing the Supreme Court's suspicion of a "legislature's circuitous path
to legitimate ends" in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)); see also infra
Section III.A.1.
88. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2013).
89. Id. at 217-19.
90. Id. at 226.
91. Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 222.
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and rulemakers under rational basis review, the Fifth Circuit stressed
that its examination of the "rational relation" between the regulation
and the stated purpose was "well within Article III's confines of judicial
review."93
2. Resuscitating Economic Protectionism: Second and Tenth Circuits
In contrast to the Sixth and Fifth Circuits in Craigmiles and St.
Joseph Abbey, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Tenth Circuits have staked out ground on the opposite side of the
chasm, finding no constitutional issue with naked economic
protectionism. Much like the facts in Craigmiles, the State of Oklahoma
passed a nearly identical prohibition on casket sales, which an
Oklahoma-based couple challenged as unconstitutional after being
barred from selling caskets over the internet.94 The business owners
sued the Oklahoma State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors,
alleging violations of their constitutional rights.95 However, despite
acknowledging that obtaining a license was "no small feat," the Tenth
Circuit held that intrastate economic protectionism indeed was not only
a legitimate state interest,96 but a legitimate state hobby: "[W]hile
baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out
special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the
favored pastime of state and local governments."97 While standing with
the other judges on the panel in the judgment upholding the Oklahoma
casket sales restriction as "rationally related to [that] legitimate end,"
now-Chief Judge Tymkovich filed a separate concurring opinion to
express his view that economic protectionism may be a legitimate state
93. Id. at 227.
94. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
95. Id.
96. Under its extensive Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
come to the opposite conclusion regarding economic protectionism for interstate commerce. In
essence, the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting protectionist legislation
that would burden out-of-state participants, and the Court has demonstrated a penchant for
uncovering such economic protectionism affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a New Jersey law banning the
importation of out-of-state waste, inferring that it was enacted for "protectionist reasons" when
the state could offer no legitimate justification). The plaintiffs in Powers alleged an alternative
claim that Oklahoma's restriction on casket sales violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, but to
no avail. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1214 n.11; see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 21, at 1135-36 (noting
that the outcome in Powers v. Harris "eviscerates constitutional law's ability to safeguard robust
competition and its benefits to consumer welfare").
97. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1221.
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interest, but only if it "advances either the general welfare or a public
interest."98
The Second Circuit has likewise given its blessing to naked
economic protectionism, or what it pithily deems "politics."99 In 2011,
the Connecticut State Dental Commission issued a rule empowering
only licensed dentists to provide certain teeth-whitening procedures,
specifically those services involving a light-emitting diode ("LED") light
to enhance the whitening process.100 Sensational Smiles, a non-dentist
teeth-whitening business, filed suit, arguing that the Connecticut
regulation prohibiting them from shining LED lights at consumers'
teeth was unconstitutional because there was no rational relationship
between the rule and the state's interest in the public's oral health.10
The business owners instead alleged that the true motive for the
passage of the rule was not protection of consumers' dental health but
"protect[ion] [of] the monopoly on dental services enjoyed by licensed
dentists in the state of Connecticut."10 2
However, in reviewing the constitutional challenge to the
Connecticut Dental Commission's rule, the Second Circuit found no
merit in the allegations of "naked economic protectionism."10 3 Judge
Calabresi, writing for himself and one other judge on the panel,
asserted that a rational basis existed for the regulation and therefore it
survived the challenge, notwithstanding that the regulation was likely
passed with the "sole purpose [ofJ shield[ing] a particular group from
intrastate economic competition."1 0 4
The divergence in the outcomes of these cases from those of the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits illuminates the deep split on this issue.
Moreover, that the cases upholding economic-protectionist licensing
regimes are themselves fractured opinions bolsters the seriousness of
this fundamental disagreement within the federal appellate courts. To
elucidate, both Powers and Sensational Smiles issued two opinions each
for the three-judge panels, while the circuits condemning naked
98. Id. at 1225-26 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court has insisted
that "pure economic parochialism" must "advance some public good" (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955))).
99. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 285-87 (2d Cir. 2015).
100. Id. at 283.
101. Id. at 283-84.
102. Id. at 285.
103. Id. at 285, 288.
104. Id. at 286--87 ("Much of what states do is to favor certain groups over others on economic
grounds. We call this politics."). But see supra note 96 (discussing the Supreme Court's concern for
interstate economic protectionism).
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economic protectionism issued single unified opinions.105 Thus, even the
judges on the reviewing courts cannot agree whether economic
protectionism alone is a sufficient justification for upholding
regulations under rational basis review. 106 Clearly, then, given the
inter- and intra-circuit nature of the split, the issue warrants Supreme
Court clarification. 107
3. Don't Thread on Me: A Treatise on Economic Liberty108
A recent case from the Texas Supreme Court, Patel v. Texas
Department of Licensing & Regulation, offers another compelling data
point on this circuit split. In a case filed in 2009, the Texas Supreme
Court ultimately issued a ruling in 2015 regarding the state's 750-hour
training requirement for eyebrow threaders.109 The case went up to the
state's highest court after the Texas Department of Licensing and
Regulation ("TDLR") ordered several salon owners to complete the 750
hours of training to obtain the required certificate or else shutter their
eyebrow threading businesses.110 The threaders challenged the
licensing requirement as an unconstitutional infringement on their due
process liberties under both the state and federal constitutions.n
Unlike the approach courts typically take when reviewing
economic regulations,112 the Texas Supreme Court conducted a much
more rigorous review of the record, the rationales put forth by the state
licensing board for enacting the requirements, and the burdens imposed
105. Compare St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) (unanimous
opinion), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (unanimous opinion), with
Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 282 (separate concurring opinion by Judge Droney), and Powers
v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (separate concurring opinion by Judge Tymkovich).
106. See Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 288 (Droney, J., concurring) (emphasizing that "there
must be at least some perceived public benefit for legislation . .. to survive rational basis review
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses").
107. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (identifying cases where "a United States court of appeals has
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter" as a compelling reason for Supreme Court review); Melanie DeFiore, Note,
Where Techs Rush In, Courts Should Fear to Tread: How Courts Should Respond to the Changing
Economics of Today, 38 CARDozo L. REV. 761, 765 (2016) ("By explicitly stating that such economic
protectionism was constitutionally viable, the Second Circuit amplified an existing disagreement
amongst the federal circuit courts.").
108. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 95 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J.,
concurring).
109. Id. at 73 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 74.
111. Id. (quoting the challengers' complaint against the law that it "violated their
constitutional right 'to earn an honest living in the occupation of one's choice free from
unreasonable governmental interference' ").
112. See id. at 100 (Willett, J., concurring) (describing the traditional rational basis test as
"tantamount to no test at all; at most it is pass/fail, and government never fails").
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on salon owners and practitioners.113 In evaluating the "actual, real-
world effect" of the law, the Texas Supreme Court held that a law may
be deemed unconstitutional if "the statute's effect as a whole is so
unreasonably burdensome that it becomes oppressive in relation to the
underlying governmental interest."114 Regarding the regulation at
issue, the majority opinion examined the large number of training
hours unrelated to the practice of eyebrow threading, the out-of-pocket
costs expended to enroll in the training, and the foregone employment
opportunities while acquiring the hours.115 In light of the regulation as
a whole, the Texas Supreme Court ultimately determined that the
requirements made the regulation, "not just unreasonable or harsh,"
but oppressively burdensome.116
Admittedly, Justice Willett, in his fifty-seven-page concurrence,
emphasized how the state's constitution offered more expansive
protections of economic liberty than the U.S. Constitution: "One of our
constitutions (federal) is short, the other (state) is long-like really
long-but both underscore liberty's primacy. . . ."117 Nevertheless, the
Patel decision demonstrates that when it comes to investigating the
governmental interest behind the passage of a law and the subsequent
burdens imposed on average citizens, courts are not entirely
impotent.118
II. UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALES FOR AND THE JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS
This Part analyzes the rise of protectionist occupational
licensing schemes through the lens of public choice theory, positing that
powerful special interest groups motivate state legislatures, not
concerns for the public good.119 Next, this Part addresses the
impenetrable haze surrounding the Supreme Court's use of tiers of
scrutiny, contending that the obscurity of the standards furnishes an
113. Id. at 87 (majority opinion) ("Although whether a law is unconstitutional is a question of
law, the determination will in most instances require the reviewing court to consider the entire
record, including evidence offered by the parties.").
114. Id.
115. Id. at 90.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 92, 110 (Willett, J., concurring) ("The economic-liberty test under ... the Texas
Constitution is more searching than the minimalist test under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." (emphasis omitted)).
118. See id. at 120 ("[Aln independent judiciary must judge government actions, not merely
rationalize them. Judicial restraint doesn't require courts to ignore the nonrestraint of the other
branches, not when their actions imperil the constitutional liberties of people increasingly
hamstrung in their enjoyment of 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' ").
119. See infra Section II.A.
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opportunity for a more significant role for judicial engagement when
reviewing occupational licensing regimes.120 Noting the inadequacy of
the judiciary's tradition of near-blind deference, this Part concludes
with a discussion of the futility of advocating for a heightened standard
of review for all economic regulations.121
A. Neither the Public Choice nor for the Public Good: Understanding
Occupational Licensing Through Public Choice Theory
As legal scholar Paul J. Larkin, Jr.122 explains in his recent
article, public choice theory best explains the rise in occupational
licensing requirements, at least in part.123 Using basic economic
principles, public choice theory posits that politicians and other
lawmakers are generally motivated not by altruistic concerns for their
constituents but by economic self-interest.1 2 4 In an ideal world, only a
general concern for the public at large and a sense of civic duty would
inspire law and decisionmakers. By questioning this illusory dream,
public choice theory presents a more realistic vision of the world,
recognizing that lawmakers are human, too, and thus not infrequently
motivated by self-interest. 125
Public choice theory not only uncovers the general motives of
legislators but also helps to explain the prevalence of occupational
licensing laws for even the most mundane and arguably harmless
120. See infra Section II.B.
121. See infra Section II.C.
122. Senior Legal Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation; M.P.P., the George Washington
University (2010); J.D., Stanford Law School (1980); B.A., Washington & Lee University (1977).
123. Larkin, supra note 5, at 227-28 ("By applying principles of microeconomics and game
theory to politics, Public Choice Theory explains why regulated businesses, not consumers, prefer
and seek out licensing requirements.").
124. As the founding economist James M. Buchanan has described it, public choice theory
brings to light the realities of political institutions, exposing "politics without romance": "Public
choice theory has been the avenue through which a romantic and illusory set of notions about the
workings of governments and the behavior of persons who govern has been replaced by a set of
notions that embody more skepticism about what governments can do and what governors will
do ..... JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Politics Without Romance, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.
BUCHANAN: THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 45, 46 (1999). See also Steve
Mariotti, What Every Voter Should Know About Public Choice Theory, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(Sept. 29, 2015, 8:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-mariottilwhat-every-voter-should-
kb 8217650.html [https://perma.cc/8TYH-6UT7] (explaining the importance of public choice
theory in the context of the 2016 presidential election).
125. But see Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1590 (suggesting that "it would be a purely
subjective judgment to say that a state legislature adopted the anticompetitive [occupational
licensing] policy because its members were 'captured,' rather than because they believed the
adopted policy was in the public interest").
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professions.126 The combination of public choice theory and restraints
on occupational freedom is no modern development.127 For instance,
returning to the Lochner case, "subsequent analysts . . . have
demonstrated that the law at issue in Lochner, despite its guise as a
health regulation, was probably a rent-seeking, competition-reducing
measure supported by labor unions and large bakeries for the purpose
of driving small bakeries and their large immigrant workforce out of
business."128
Almost always, legislatures tout consumer health and safety as
the justification for enacting many of these occupational licensing laws,
but who exactly is the group pushing their passage?129 Consumer safety
groups? Public health institutes? Peel away the veneer of "public health
and safety" and, ironically enough, it is usually the trade organizations
themselves that push for these licensing requirements.13 0 Essentially,
these trade groups are saying, "Look how dangerous we are, you must
regulate us!" 1 3 1
But really, these are special interest groups-the cosmetology
lobby, in the case of eyebrow threaders or shampoo technicians-
exerting their influence on state legislatures to stifle competition and
prevent newcomers from capitalizing on services that cosmetologists
already provide.13 2 Once the beauticians have eliminated the possibility
126. See Klein, supra note 65, at 465 ("Occupational licensing statutes serve a useful purpose,
but their utility is often clouded by legislation designed to restrict competition and pad incumbents'
power, rather than protect the public.").
127. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 226 (marking private firms' involvement in licensing as "not
an aberration caused by unique modern developments").
128. Rebecca L. Brown, Constitutional Tragedies: The Dark Side of Judgment, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 139, 142 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); see supra Section I.A. But see Kens, supra note 40, at 409 (noting
that the suggestion that the law was a form of rent-seeking is based not on primary sources from
the time, "but rather on a set of assumptions growing out of modern economic theory").
129. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 104 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J.,
concurring) ("As Nobel economist Milton Friedman observed, 'the justification' for licensing is
always to protect the public, but 'the reason' for licensing is shown by observing who pushes for
it-usually those representing not consumers but vested, already-licensed practitioners." (citing
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 240 (1980))).
130. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 21, at 1111 (noting that "unlike other regulatory bodies,
licensing boards became dominantly comprised of practitioners themselves . . . but self-dealing is
inevitable when the regulated act as regulators"); Larkin, supra note 5, at 227 ("Incumbent
businesses support licensing requirements because licensing protects incumbents against
competition.").
131. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910:
A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 497 (1965) ("Friendly licensing legislation was
almost invariably suggested and drafted by groups within the affected occupation. We have here,
then, a situation in which the regulated group was responsible for its own public regulation.").
132. Larkin, supra note 5, at 226-27 ("Private individuals rarely urge governments to adopt
licensing regimes, but private firms often do. . . . '[F]riendly licensing' [is] almost invariably
suggested and drafted by groups within the affected occupation.").
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of new competition by erecting barriers to enter the cosmetology
profession, they can maintain higher prices.133 By "hijack[ing] state
power for the benefit of a few," 134 this cronyism benefits only the
cosmetology lobby and the legislators. Forced to pay higher prices to
compensate for inflated wages, the consumer public suffers, while
would-be beauticians are xcluded from the profession.13 5
For direct evidence of this, one need only look to the Tennessee
shampoo technician example.136 Tennessee, in addition to being one of
only four states requiring shampoo technicians to undergo training and
pass an examination,137 boasts the highest annual mean wage in the
country for individuals who wash hair for a living, nearly twice as much
as neighboring states.13 8 To illustrate, a hair shampooer in the Memphis
metropolitan area, where a license is required, can make an average of
$33,620 per year, while an individual doing the same job in neighboring
North Carolina, where no license is required, earns an average of
$17,790.139 It is no wonder that occupational icensing is estimated each
year to siphon off $100 billion from the economy in annual cost to
consumers.140 While some may praise this nearly two-fold increase in
earnings, it is also not a big leap to suggest hat the inflated discrepancy
in the salaries for hair washers is passed onto consumers in the form of
higher prices.14 1 Further, the increased wages for the licensed few
133. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1566 (detailing empirical study findings that
occupational licensing barriers "lead to higher prices, reduce consumer choice, and provide few if
any consumer benefits in terms of increased quality"); Larkin, supra note 5, at 227 ("Licensing
requirements thereby enable [existing practitioners] to receive 'economic rents'-that is,
supracompetitive profits made available by laws limiting rivalry.").
134. Larkin, supra note 5, at 235.
135. Id. at 235-37; see also infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
136. See supra Introduction and infra Section III.B.
137. In addition to Tennessee, other states requiring some combination of education or
examination in order to legally wash hair include New Hampshire, Louisiana, and Texas. Alabama
has no schooling or examination requirement, but does require would-be shampooers to pay a fee
to the state. License to Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing,
Shampooer, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/license-to-work/1tw-occupation/?id=76 (last visited
July 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EG5J-FSKN].
138. See BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Occupational Employment Statistics -
Shampooers (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes395093.htm [https://perma.cc/
7L4E-6F8S].
139. Id. ($33,620 in Memphis and $31,370 in Nashville metropolitan area, compared with
$18,240 and $17,790 in Alabama and North Carolina, respectively).
140. MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING
COMPETITION? 150 (2006); see also Rudish, supra note 33, at 1530 (recognizing that deeming "pure
economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest may result in the establishment and
maintenance of certain in-state monopolies and drive up prices for consumers").
141. Larkin, supra note 5, at 235-38; see KLEINER, supra note 3, at 12:
Policy makers need to examine and determine whether these increases in economic
status to licensed workers are a result of increased quality caused by greater training
1682
2017] DO YOUR JOB 1683
arguably come at the expense of numerous potential hair washers
barred from working, who earn no wages.142
Proponents of occupational licensing regimes would likely
suggest that anyone unhappy with the requirements solicit their local
or state representative.1 4 3 However, examined through the lens of
public choice theory, majoritarian rule and the political process offer
inadequate protection for this widely dispersed group of excluded
practitioners.144 Supreme Court precedent suggests hat "discrete and
insular minorities" deserve enhanced safeguards because of their
relative inability to effectively organize and spur legislative reform.145
However, this example of excluded practitioners calls into question the
validity of that suggestion. Simply because these excluded individuals
are not a "discrete and insular minority"146-in reality, such a group is
likely to be widely dispersed and diverse-does not then imply that it is
a group that can organize and effectuate change through representative
government. 147
In fact, the compact and homogenous special interest groups
tend to enjoy more political success than their size might suggest,148
oftentimes due to the impact of money and its disproportionately large
ability to influence legislation.149 While a political actor's self-interests
that result in higher-quality services, or whether they are a result of restricted
competition through the limiting of entry into the occupations, or both.
142. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1567 ("Not only do these barriers make purchasing
certain services more expensive, but they also eliminate yet another option to earn a living for
those who already have so few.").
143. See Shanor, supra note 39, at 325 ("Whether or not licenses improve health and safety or
promote protectionism are important questions for the political branches. But the fact of legislative
line drawing or 'speech as such' does not make them ones for heightened constitutional review.").
144. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 324 ("Elected officials will be most responsive to whatever
groups increase their prospects for reelection, which favors established, small, tightly knit, single-
issue groups that benefit from laws granting them economic rents.").
145. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
146. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 324:
[T]he parties seeking to enter most such [licensed] professions are precisely the type of
individuals for whom seeking relief through the ballot box is generally a futile endeavor.
Injured but disorganized individuals are powerless to prevent a compact, organized
minority's interests from swaying the political process to work in its favor.
147. Id. ('The identification and coordination costs necessary to obtain the repeal of a statute
are prohibitive even though the total number of members of the first group greatly outnumbers
the latter."); see also McCloskey, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing the "prejudices against [discrete
minorities]" present in the political processes).
148. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) ("[C]ertain groups enjoy organizational advantages that
enable them to exercise 'disproportionate' influence on politicians and regulators and thus secure
laws favoring their interests even when those laws injure large groups with diffuse interests (e.g.,
the general public) and impose a net loss on society.").
149. Will Clark, Comment, Intermediate Scrutiny as a Solution to Economic Protectionism in
Occupational Licensing, 60 ST. Louis U. L.J. 345, 359 (2016) (emphasizing collective action
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may be checked by her concern for re-election, "there is nothing to
channel outcomes towards the needs of the non-median voting groups,"
or in this case, the groups harmed by these occupational licensing laws
who are unlikely to organize in such a way as to serve as the proper
check on a political actor's self-interest.15 0
Consequently, when the representative process falters and
politically powerless groups suffer, the courts should intervene.
Theoretically, as the "least dangerous branch,"15 1 the judiciary is not
political 52 and should be less motivated by the rent-seeking that sways
other public actors.153 However, by applying the least rigorous form of
review to occupational licensing laws, the courts have effectively turned
a blind-eye to the political failure.154 And by withholding meaningful
judicial review, "the rational basis test allows politically well-connected
participants to exploit the legislative and regulatory processes for their
own profit, with only flimsy pretexts of benefitting the general public.
The result is to deprive those with little political influence of rights that
ought to be constitutionally secured."1 55
B. "An Unworkable Morass"- The Current State of the Court's Tiers of
Scrutiny56
While the Supreme Court has never been particularly
transparent in opining which test it is using and why-the
problems when "[e]stablished industry groups are in a better position to lobby legislatures,
[and c]onsumers do not spend time or money opposing protectionist laws because the negative
effects of those laws are widely dispersed among consumers").
150. BUCHANAN, supra note 124, at 56.
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
152. Whether the Court is truly as apolitical as presumed is the subject of scholarly debate.
See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 9 (2002) (questioning whether "the view that courts are neutral
arbiters who do not make the law but find the law" accurately describes the Supreme Court).
Additionally, several states continue to select some or all of their state judges through partisan
elections, theoretically subjecting the candidates to some of the same interest group pressures from
which an unelected judiciary is otherwise insulated. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (authorizing
the election of the justices of the Supreme Court of Texas, the same court that penned the Patel
decision, discussed supra Section I.B.3).
153. McGinnis, supra note 32, at 522 ("[T]he judiciary is relatively insulated from the
preferences of constituents and less subject o partisan bias and interest group pressure.").
154. See James M. Buchanan, Market Failure and Political Failure, 8 CATO J. 1, 4 (1988)
(comparing "theories of market failure" with "theories of political failure").
155. Timothy Sandefur, State "Competitor's Veto" Laws and the Right to Earn a Living: Some
Paths to Federal Reform, 38 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1009, 1016 (2015).
156. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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Constitution, of course, "does not prescribe tiers of scrutiny"157-the
divisions on the spectrum between rational basis and strict scrutiny has
only continued to deteriorate in recent years.158 In some cases, the Court
has arguably applied a more rigorous form of rational basis,159 while in
others it has employed a more forgiving version of strict scrutiny.160 In
other cases, the Court has cited no test at all.161 Further, the Court has
never articulated its criteria for determining what it considers to be a
"fundamental" right worthy of this more exacting judicial review.162
Indeed, it seems that "[lt]he label the Court affixes to its level of scrutiny
in assessing whether the government can restrict a given right . .. is
increasingly a meaningless formalism."163
Given the split not only amongst the circuits but within the
circuit panels themselves, the Supreme Court's answer to the question
157. Id. at 2327.
158. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 518-20.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("As nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees with [reviewing this classification only for its rationality];
its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis
cases . . . . But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential
framework."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that "the
record does not reveal any rational basis" for the zoning ordinance); see also infra Section III.A. 1.
Scholars and commentators have labeled this more onerous variation of rational basis as "rational
basis plus," "rational basis with bite," or "rational basis with teeth." Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational
Basis 'Plus,"32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 449-50 (2017).
160. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding the University of
Texas's college admission program despite its use of race holistically as a qualifying factor). As it
is traditionally understood, strict scrutiny applies to government actions that infringe on
"fundamental rights" or that discriminate on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race or
national origin. Pollvogt, supra note 25, at 1050.
161. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (failing to cite a test in its decision
recognizing the right to marry as a "fundamental right"); Pollvogt, supra note 25, at 1045-46
("Specifically, [in Windsor,] Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, did not invoke any of the
traditional doctrinal structures of equal protection analysis, such as suspect classification analysis,
fundamental rights analysis, or the associated mechanism of heightened scrutiny.").
162. Joel S. Nolette, Comment, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt: Judicial Review When
the Court Wants To, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 633, 640 (2016):
[There is very little one can say about the 'personal' iberty that the Court has
recognized to be 'fundamental' that cannot equally be said about other liberty interests
that the Court has recognized but nevertheless decided to protect less (or not at all),
such as the right to earn a living in a lawful occupation. (internal citations omitted);
see also Evan Bernick, Towards a Consistent Economic Liberty Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 479, 498-99 (2015) ("The importance of the freedom at stake highlights the pressing need for
consistent judicial enforcement of constitutional safeguards against naked economic
preferences."); Pollvogt, supra note 25, at 1061 (addressing, in the context of the question of same-
sex marriage, the Court's failure to "model a disciplined approach to framing the fundamental
rights inquiry"),
163. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2326-27 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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of the constitutional validity of protectionist economic regulations is
long overdue.164 As many of the judges in these cases recognize, the
Court need not "resurrect Lochner"65 in order to reject the proposition
that naked economic protectionism serves a legitimate state interest. 166
Although states may proffer legitimate public benefit justifications
when challenged, "it is quite different to say that protectionism for its
own sake is sufficient to survive rational basis review."16 7
C. Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny: Heightened Review as a Non
Sequitur
Some commentators have suggested that intermediate scrutiny
is the appropriate framework under which to review economic
regulations,1 6 8 while others have suggested that economic liberties are
inherently "fundamental,"16 9 a distinction which would trigger strict
scrutiny.170 However, both of these levels of review are unworkable.
Existing precedent suggests hat arguments advocating the application
of heightened scrutiny to economic regulations are unlikely to persuade
the Court.171
164. See Miller, supra note 59, at 428 (posing the question, more than thirty years ago, if it is
"time to re-examine the wisdom of 'see-no-evil, hear-no-evil' as the prevailing philosophy in
economic regulation cases"). But see Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
165. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 289 (Droney, J., concurring). See generally Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d
69, 94 n.11 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J., concurring) ("The Lochner bogeyman is a mirage but a ready
broadside aimed at those who apply rational basis rationally.").
166. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Nor is the ghost
of Lochner lurking about."); see also David Bernstein, Do Laws that Embody "Naked Economic
Protectionism" Violate the Equal Protection Clause?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 14, 2015)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/14/do-laws-that-embody-
naked-economic-protectionism-violate-the-equal-protection-clause/?utmterm=.c7909c412b74
[https://perma.cclRA8M-2Z5E] ("[O]ne need not revive Lochner or indeed change modern equal
protection jurisprudence at all to find that naked economic protectionism violates the equal
protection clause.").
167. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 289 (Droney, J., concurring) ("[A]nd I do not think the
Supreme Court would endorse that approach.").
168. Clark, supra note 149, at 355-56; Klein, supra note 65, at 461 ("Given the importance of
the right to pursue a common calling, barriers to entry into a lawful profession should be subject
to a more thorough scrutiny than rational basis review.").
169. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 5, 5 (2012).
170. Strict scrutiny has often been described as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"
underscoring the difficulty of surviving such stringent judicial review. See infra notes 174-178 and
accompanying text.
171. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756-58 (2011)
(suggesting that "pluralism anxiety" is the cause of the Court's "closure of the heightened scrutiny
canon").
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First, strict scrutiny is particularly inappropriate for the review
of economic regulations or economic rights.172 Although the ability to
pursue a common calling is certainly an important right,173 deeming it
a "fundamental right" for purposes of strict scrutiny review is a futile
exercise.17 4 Many scholars have suggested that the Court's application
of strict scrutiny is a death-knell for the law at issue.7 5 In fact, strict
scrutiny has been described as "strict in theory, fatal in fact,"'7 6 a
characterization with which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took issue in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena.177 However, despite the criticism of the
catchy phrase, it is accurate nonetheless. Subjecting an economic
regulation to the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny would
result in near-certain invalidation, as only a handful of laws have ever
survived the Court's strict scrutiny scythe.17
Moreover, advocating for the application of intermediate
scrutiny for economic regulations and occupational licensing raises
similar challenges. While proponents of utilizing intermediate scrutiny
submit that the standard is "well-defined"179-an arguably dubious
claim following the Supreme Court's portrayal of intermediate scrutiny
in United States v. Virginia 8 0-subjecting all occupational licensing
laws to intermediate scrutiny would be asking too much of the judiciary.
Additionally, there is the concern that applying too stringent of a
172. See DeFiore, supra note 107, at 787 ("By undertaking a 'probing review' of each action
taken by state legislators, courts would cripple governments and hinder their ability to experiment
with new forms of regulation."); Shanor, supra note 39, at 324 (highlighting the difficulties in
defining the limits of the "right" worthy of more stringent judicial review).
173. See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(describing the right to work as "the most precious liberty that man possesses"); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) ("It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition.").
174. Shanor, supra note 39, at 325 ("Without a principled limit on when and how the
Constitution can be invoked as a shield against economic regulation, we will embrace a world
sharply tilted against democratic governance.").
175. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
176. Id.
177. See 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.' ").
178. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 826 (2006) (questioning the validity of the
traditional characterization, yet noting that only approximately twenty-five percent of laws
subjected to strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court survive).
179. Clark, supra note 149, at 361 (advocating for the categorical application of "the well-
defined intermediate scrutiny test to occupational icensing laws").
180. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, depicted a more muscular iteration of the
intermediate scrutiny standard, requiring an "exceedingly persuasive" and genuine justification,
where "[t]he burden of justification is demanding and ... rests entirely on the State." United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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standard to licensing laws would put all licenses in jeopardy,181 even
those that govern surgeons or other healthcare professions, and would
upset the balance between the judicial and legislative branches of
government. 182 Further, applying intermediate scrutiny categorically to
occupational licensing laws 183 would pose the problem of determining
which laws specifically qualify for categorical scrutiny and which are
not occupational licensing but just traditional economic regulations.
This sort of confounding cherry-picking underscores the unworkability
of applying a fixedly heightened standard of review.
III. THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW: JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
As discussed above, the status quo of using toothless rational
basis for occupational licensing fails to uncover the pure economic
protectionism that often motivates these licensing schemes.184 Public
choice theory helps to explain the proliferation of these sorts of
regulations,185 and indeed underscores the reality that genuine
concerns for consumer health and safety do not always occupy the
forefront of the drafters' or proponents' minds.186 Additionally, the
current inter- and intra-circuit split over whether pure economic
protectionism, without something more, constitutes a legitimate state
interest highlights the serious shortcomings of the existing judicial
reviewing framework for occupational licensing.187
As an alternative, this Part proposes a solution, recommending
continued adherence to the traditional labels of the standards of review,
by combining rational basis review with judicial engagement. To
demonstrate the judiciary's capacity for judicial engagement, this Part
examines the Supreme Court's animus jurisprudence and the Court's
ability to uncover illicit motivations, followed by a study of its balancing
181. David Crump, How Do Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights?
Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 795, 846-47 (1996)
(recognizing that the consequence of a "free-enterprise penumbra" deserving of stricter scrutiny
"would be the indiscriminate destruction of every kind of economic regulation, including those that
no one otherwise would regard as unconstitutional").
182. Larkin, supra note 5, at 321 (positing that "even if there is a sound theoretical
justification for heightened judicial review [of economic regulations], do we ask too much of the
judiciary to undertake that responsibility?").
183. See Clark, supra note 149, at 356 (arguing as such).
184. See Sandefur, supra note 155, at 1018 (explaining that the application of a lenient
rational basis review "means closing the judiciary's eyes to the rent-seeking shenanigans that
result in anti-competitive laws").
185. Larkin, supra note 5, at 228-35.
186. Id. at 215 ("[Mlany occupational licensing schemes are the product of practitioners' self-
serving political efforts, rather than a considered attempt to improve the public welfare.").
187. Klein, supra note 65, at 438-48.
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of interests in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. Additionally, this
Part applies the Court's Whole Woman's Health and animus reasoning
to Tennessee's shampoo technician licensing in order to demonstrate
the practicality of asking judges to do their job and engage with the
record before them.188
A. Rational Basis-with-Judicial-Engagement
Courts should continue to apply rational basis review to
occupational licensing regulations, but combine that review with
"judicial engagement" when they suspect that economic protectionism
motivated the law. As discussed more fully in Justice Willett's Patel
concurrence, judicial engagement is the idea that "courts meaningfully
enforce constitutional boundaries, lest judicial restraint become judicial
surrender."189 However, judicial engagement does not mean that a
judge should merely substitute her preference for that of the
legislature, but rather that a court need not "put a heavy, pro-
government thumb on the scale."190 Instead, in defending a statute, the
government must provide, and a court must examine, an honest,
reasoned explanation for the law1 91 in order to determine whether the
benefits bestowed on the public outweigh the costs.19 2 Additionally,
unlike the application of heightened scrutiny, the use of rational basis-
with-judicial-engagement would not jeopardize those licensing regimes
that serve genuine legitimate public health or safety purposes, like
those in the medical field.193 For instance, the benefits of requiring
licensing for surgeons-preventing an untrained individual from taking
a scalpel to the flesh of an unsuspecting "patient"-undoubtedly
outweigh the potential burdens of requiring individuals to attend
medical school and pass board exams. Licensing, such as those for
doctors or dentists, would pass the cost-benefit inquiry with ease, even
if there were an element of economic protectionism, because the benefits
188. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 104 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J.,
concurring) ("Degree of difficulty aside, judges exist to be judgmental, hence the title.").
189. Id. at 96; see supra Section I.B.3.
190. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 95.
191. McGinnis, supra note 32, at 524 ("The [state] thus has the burden of articulating the
constitutionally justifiable interest the statute advances and the evidence for that proposition, not
because the Constitution puts a particular burden on the [state], but because it represents the
defendant . . . .").
192. Cf. DeFiore, supra note 107, at 793 (advocating for "near absolute deference" to the
legislature for economic regulations, while simultaneously suggesting that a reviewing court may
examine the court record for "clear and convincing evidence that [the regulation] is morally
offensive and contrary to the interests of justice").
193. Cf. Rudish, supra note 33, at 1530 (warning that a refusal to recognize economic
protectionism as a legitimate state interest "would invalidate a wide range of legislation").
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of protecting life and limb so greatly dwarf the burdens of obtaining a
license.
Despite the general conservative disparagement of judicial
activism,194 "[t]he great deference due state economic regulation does
not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the
context of its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical
explanations for regulations."'9 5 Traditionally, the Court claims
ineptitude in its ability to review legislation deemed economic.196 Yet
despite these pleas of impotence, the Supreme Court has recently
demonstrated that it is most certainly not helpless when it comes to
evaluating the legitimacy or value of legislation enacted ostensibly to
protect the public health and safety.197 In fact, the Court has already
applied iterations of the type of judicial engagement hat this Note
advocates for.
1. Detecting Illicit Motives: The Court's Animus Jurisprudence
For an example of the Court's ability to "engage forthrightly"19 8
during a rational basis analysis, we have only to look to its
jurisprudence concerning animus.199 Specifically, precedent indicates
that there are two ways to establish the presence of animus: (1) "by
pointing to direct evidence of private bias" in the record, or (2) "by
supporting an inference of animus based on the structure of a law." 2 0 0
194. See Barry K. Arrington & Richard A. Epstein, Right-Wing Judicial Activism?,
CLAREMONT REV. BooKs, Winter 2011/12, at 7, 8, http://www.claremont.org/crb/article/arguing-
natural-law/ [https://perma.cc/NF3J-AJC5] ("The essence of conservative constitutional
jurisprudence is that where the Constitution does not speak, judges must also remain silent and
defer to the democratic process . . . ."); see also Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 97 (Willett, J., concurring) ("A
prominent fault line has opened on the right between traditional conservatives who champion
majoritarianism and more liberty-minded theorists who believe robust judicial protection of
economic rights is indispensable to limited government.").
195. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Patel, 469 S.W.3d
at 96-97 (Willett, J., concurring).
196. Nolette, supra note 162, at 640 ("[I]t seems that only in cases involving economic
regulation do judges claim to lack the acumen to recognize corruption, self-interest, and
arbitrariness or insist on deferring to the majoritarian imperative.").
197. Id. at 635 ("[The Court proved itself quite capable of actually reviewing, and striking
down, what superficially appeared to be classic health and safety regulations, but were in fact
provisions enacted to interfere with the exercise of individual rights without sufficient
justification. . . .").
198. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 96 (Willett, J., concurring).
199. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, UnconstitutionalAnimus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 928 (2012)
("Rather than provoking the Court to apply a form of heightened scrutiny, we can read the cases
as providing plaintiffs with an opportunity to challenge rational basis review with affirmative
evidence.").
200. Id. at 926; see also Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review:




Although the Court has never conclusively defined animus as a matter
of doctrine,201 the concept is generally understood to mean, in its
broadest erms, an impermissible desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, either directly20 2 or indirectly by instead benefiting the favored
group.203
The Supreme Court first grappled with unconstitutional animus
in 1973 in USDA v. Moreno,204 where it found direct evidence of animus
in the legislative record.205 While ostensibly applying only rational basis
review,206 the Court nonetheless "proceeded to reject various
justifications for the statute that would have plainly passed muster
under the lenient rational basis test."2 07 The congressional statute at
issue in Moreno excluded from participation in the federal food stamp
program "any household containing an individual who is unrelated to
any other member of the household."208 In defending the limitation on
food stamp eligibility, the government argued that its law was
"rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in
minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program."209
However, by investigating the legislative history of the
amendment to the Food Stamp Act, the Court determined that
Congress specifically drafted the legislation to prevent "so-called
'hippies' or 'hippy communes' from participating in the food stamp
program."210 Instead of furthering the legitimate purpose of preventing
fraud and abuse within the food stamp program-surely a legitimate
201. Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 887 (recognizing that beyond discussions in moral philosophy,
"neither precedent nor scholarship has stated conclusively how animus is properly defined"). But
see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing
unconstitutional animus as a "fit of spite").
202. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634;
USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
203. Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 925 (describing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1982), as
an "instancel where the government merely sought to preserve resources for a favored social
group, not harm the excluded group").
204. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
205. Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 927 (describing USDA v. Moreno as an "easy case" given the
direct evidence of the true purpose of the law).
206. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (referring to "legitimate" governmental interests and "rational"
relations to that interest, hallmarks of traditional rational basis review).
207. Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA.
L. REV. 1065, 1082-83 (2013).
208. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529 (discussing the 1971 amendment o the Food Stamp Act of 1964,
7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (2012)).
209. Id. at 535.
210. Id. at 543 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that for purposes of eligibility, the definition
of "household" was designed to "prevent 'essentially unrelated individuals who voluntarily chose
to cohabit and live off food stamps' . . . from participating in the food stamp program" (quoting 116
CONG. REC. 42003 (1970))).
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and sufficient interest' for purposes of rational basis review211-the
restriction unconstitutionally excluded a group of individuals disliked
by those charged with drafting the law, and therefore served no purpose
at all.2 12 Ultimately, the Court evaluated the government's proffered-
albeit superficial-defense, but weighed that purpose against what it
viewed as "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group."213 Animus toward a politically unpopular group, therefore, is
not a permissible governmental purpose.214 Notably, the Court in
Moreno also did not distinguish between "personal" liberties and
"economic" liberties, but rather required that any law predicated on
animus be struck as unconstitutional.215
The specter of a purpose to harm a politically powerless and
ostracized group again emerged in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, where the Cleburne City Council denied a request for a special-
use permit to build a group home made by an organization for the
developmentally disabled.216 The city had enacted a zoning ordinance
that required such a permit for the construction of, among other types
of homes, "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded."217 While the law
on its face did not specifically burden or disadvantage those individuals
with developmental disabilities or the organizations that served them,
the Court nevertheless concluded that an illicit motive was at play.218
Because there was no direct proof of animus or disdain for this
particular group, unlike the damaging material available in Moreno,
the structure of the law itself served as evidence of animus.219
Ultimately, Justice White, writing for the majority, found that
"[t]he record [did] not reveal any rational basis for believing that the
proposed group home would pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interests," and that therefore the law appeared to "rest on an
211. Berliner, supra note 64, at 376 ("Courts are mortally afraid of saying that something is
an illegitimate interest . . . .").
212. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538; see also Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor
and 'Bare Desire to Harm," 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2014) (reviewing the Moreno and
Romer decisions).
213. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
214. Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 888 ("The Court has held on numerous occasions that ...
animus ... is never a valid basis for legislation or other state action.").
215. See Raynor, supra note 207, at 1068 ("Moreno's plain language, for instance, requires
heightened review of all regulations predicated on animus, regardless of whether they target an
economic or personal liberty interest.").
216. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985).
217. Id. at 436 (quoting Cleburne, Texas, zoning regulations).
218. Id. at 450 (concluding that an "irrational prejudice" against the developmentally disabled
undergirded the city's action in denying the special-use permit).
219. Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 927.
1692 [Vol. 70:5:1663
DO YOUR JOB
irrational prejudice" against the developmentally disabled.220 Here
again, despite ostensibly utilizing the traditional rational basis
review,221 the Supreme Court engaged with the record in order to
uncover evidence of an illicit purpose, notwithstanding the city's call for
concern over location within a floodplain, overcrowding, and
harassment by students from a nearby middle school.222
More than two decades later, the Court again invoked animus
as its justification for invalidating a law under rational basis review, 223
this time involving an amendment to the Colorado state constitution
that prohibited any claims of discrimination on the basis of
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships."224 Despite the State's attempts to justify the amendment
as a law of general applicability aimed at denying only special
treatment for gays,225 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
suggested that the amendment "raise[d] the inevitable inference that
the [law] is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."226
Professor Andrew Koppelman227 summarized the Court's holding in
Romer v. Evans as follows:
If a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it disabilities that are
so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any legitimate
governmental interest, then the Court will infer that the law's purpose is simply to harm
that group, and so will invalidate the law.
22 8
Notably, the Court conducted its evaluation of the law in Romer
using only rational basis review, yet still managed to uncover the illicit
motivation underlying its passage.229
Much like the Court's animus rationale in Romer, the Court's
review of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") in United States v.
220. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 433; see also Pollvogt, supra note 199, at 927 (suggesting that
"animus may be inferred" from a lack of logical connection between the law and the government's
purported interest).
221. But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-
basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical . .. and [its] progeny.").
222. Id. at 448 (majority opinion) (detailing justifications offered by the city for denial of the
permit).
223. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
224. See COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
225. Romer, 517 U.S. at 637-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing in greater detail the
justifications proffered by the State of Colorado).
226. Id. at 634 (majority opinion) (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
227. John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern
University.
228. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 8
(2002); see also Koppelman, supra note 212, at 1058-61 (discussing the Court's animus
jurisprudence).
229. Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Windsor displays the Court's ability to "smoke out" the illicit purposes
motivating lawmakers.230 DOMA, which was passed by Congress in
1996 and subsequently signed into law by President Bill Clinton,
explicitly defined marriage as "a legal union between one man and one
woman," with the effect of excluding same-sex couples from the receipt
of any federal benefits based on marital or spousal status.231 DONA's
defenders argued that the federal statute avoided difficult choice-of-law
issues with its uniform federal definition of marriage, and maintained
the current applicability of federal laws in light of the potential for
changing circumstances at the state level.2 32 Under traditional rational
basis review, this law quite clearly maintained a rational nexus to the
government's proffered justifications.2 3 3 However, despite this arguably
rational relationship between the purpose and the law, the Court
exposed "a bare congressional desire" to stigmatize and injure same-sex
couples, meaning the law could not stand.234 As Koppelman notes,
"Windsor indicates that the Constitution is violated when a group is
deliberately singled out for broad harm for the sake of an insignificant
benefit."235
The animus jurisprudence suggests that the Court has the
intellectual wherewithal-and the willingness-to detect the presence
of animus behind a slew of other rational governmental purposes. The
Court can likewise use these skills to ferret out illicit purposes in the
government's passage of occupational licensing restrictions, chiefly
naked economic protectionism and rent-seeking on the part of existing
practitioners. While economic protectionism is not precisely the same
beast as animus, for the purposes of reviewing occupational licensing,
animus serves as an adequate analog for economic protectionism. Just
as the Court disavows laws motivated by animus, so too should it
condemn laws motivated by naked economic protectionism.
230. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); see also Koppelman, supra note
212, at 1059-61 (discussing the "telling similarities" between the Colorado amendment in Romer
and the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") in Windsor).
231. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
232. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority's
disregard of the "arguments put forward" by DOMA's defenders and suggesting that the majority
"affirmatively conceal[ed] from the reader the arguments that exist in justification").
233. Id. at 2707 ("[T]here are many perfectly valid-indeed, downright boring-justifying
rationales for this legislation.").
234. Id. at 2681 (majority opinion); see also Koppelman, supra note 212, at 1068:
A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on Tuesdays is rationally-indeed,
perfectly-related to the purpose of preventing blue Volkswagens from being driven on
Tuesdays. The real issue is whether some goals are impermissible or too costly to be
worth pursuing, a question that cannot be answered on the basis of "rationality."
235. Koppelman, supra note 212, at 1068; cf. infra Section III.A.2 (discussing the insignificant
benefits of the law in Whole Woman's Health).
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2. Demonstrating Ability to Balance Interests: Whole Woman's Health
Paradigmatic of this type of judicial engagement was the Court's
review of the Texas legislature's regulation of abortion providers in
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,236 which established that the
Court is "quite capable of doing all the things that it disclaims the
responsibility or competency to do in the context of . .. rational basis
cases."237 In Whole Woman's Health, the Court applied the undue
burden test for abortion regulations from Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,238 which requires that a court
strike as unconstitutional any law that has the "purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion."239
Despite assurances that it was merely applying existing precedent, the
Court in Whole Woman's Health seemed to turn this undue burden test
into more of a cost-benefit inquiry.240 The Court looked to the two main
requirements of the challenged Texas House Bill 2: (1) that all abortion
providers have active admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty
miles of the clinic,241 and (2) that all abortion facilities meet the
standards for ambulatory surgical centers under Texas law.2 4 2
Ultimately, the Court examined the adjudicated facts from the lower
court and determined that the burdens imposed outweighed the
purported health benefits to women, and thus invalidated the entire
law as an unconstitutional undue burden.243
Despite Texas's arguments that the surgical-center and
admitting-privileges provisions of the law were enacted to protect
women,244 the Court did not merely accept these rationales with blind
deference like it theoretically would have were the laws "merely
236. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
237. Nolette, supra note 162, at 638.
238. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
239. Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2296 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 2300 (determining whether the new law conferred medical benefits sufficient to
outweigh the burdens on access that it imposed).
241. Id. at 2310 (noting that the prior statute was less onerous, requiring either admitting
privileges or a working arrangement with a physician with admitting privileges, should
complications arise).
242. Id. at 2314 (comparing the prior law that "required abortion facilities to meet a host of
health and safety requirements" with the new law that also required "detailed specifications
relating to the size of the nursing staff, building dimensions, and other building requirements").
243. Id. (finding as well supported by the record that women would "not obtain better care or
experience more frequent positive outcomes" under the new law as compared to a previously
licensed facility).
244. Id. at 2311 (citing the State's brief that the purpose of House Bill 2 was "to help ensure




economic" and reviewed under rational basis.245 Instead, the Court
thoroughly assessed the government's evidence that these provisions
would protect women and would justify the closure of all but eight
abortion providers in the entire state.246 Unconvinced after its
meticulous examination of the statistical and expert-witness evidence,
the Court determined that the new law did not benefit patientS247 and
that it was simply "beyond rational belief that [the law] could genuinely
protect the health of women."2 4 8
To be clear, this type of judicial engagement and meaningful
review of a legislature's action does not hail the resurrection of the
"Lochner monster."249 In Lochner, the majority opinion paid no
attention to any of the evidence put forth by the State that the law truly
would benefit the health and well-being of bakers before striking the
law.2 5 0 In actuality, it seems that the five Justices in the Lochner
majority did not thoughtfully engage with the record, but instead
declared a blanket prohibition on interference with the right to
contract.251 In contrast, in Whole Woman's Health, the Court did not
simply take the government at its word, but instead inquired into the
actual consequences of the legislation.252 Although the Court applied
the abortion-specific undue burden test, the comprehensive rationale
and the meticulous analysis of the Whole Woman's Health opinion
serves as a model for the success of judicial engagement.
B. Application: The Benefits and Burdens of Shampooing in Tennessee
Relating this meaningful, evenhanded review to the
occupational licensing context, the Supreme Court has revealed its
willingness to expose impermissible animus motivations and weigh the
potential benefits of legislation against the purported justifications.253
The Court has demonstrated that it is perfectly capable of determining
whether the alleged benefits to public health and safety actually
245. See id. at 2309-20 (devoting nearly a dozen pages to an examination of the statistical
evidence and testimony).
246. Id. at 2316.
247. Id. at 2311 (finding nothing in the record that demonstrated that "the new law advanced
Texas' legitimate interest in protecting women's health").
248. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Nolette, supra note 162, at 638.
249. See Crump, supra note 181, at 846; supra note 165 and accompanying text.
250. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).
251. Id.; see supra note 48 (discussing the factual background of the Lochner decision).
252. Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
253. See Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial
Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2038 (2014) ("In recent decades,
[scholars] have noted that the Court has increasingly examined the adequacy of the state's factual
record supporting the law's purpose and chosen means for achieving that purpose.").
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materialize to justify the additional burdens imposed by the law.2 54
Moreover, through its animus jurisprudence, the Court has confirmed
its aptitude for uncovering unlawful motivations for laws, despite
seemingly lawful justifications proffered by the government.255
To demonstrate the practicality and viability of the rational-
basis-with-judicial-engagement review standard, the Tennessee
shampoo technician statute serves as a case study for scrutinizing an
existing occupational licensing law using a combination of the
strategies employed by the Court in its animus jurisprudence and in
Whole Woman's Health.256 The Tennessee law and corollary criminal
offense were enacted presumably to protect the public from rogue
shampooerS257-as many of the occupational licensing and economic
regulations passed by state legislatures are enacted in the name of
consumer safety.258 In reviewing this occupational licensing
requirement,259 a court following the Whole Woman's Health cost-
benefit analysis would need to weigh the burdens imposed by the rule
and whether they are sufficiently outweighed by the benefit the public
receives.260 Ultimately in conducting this calculus, "[i]f the benefit is
trivial by comparison with the cost, then it is appropriate to infer that
254. Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311 (finding nothing in the record that
demonstrated that "the new law advanced Texas' legitimate interest in protecting women's
health"); see supra Section III.A.2.
255. See supra Section III.A.1.
256. As this Note goes to publication, the Tennessee legislature is currently considering a
remedial bill to exempt the practice of shampooing from the shampooing licensing requirement.
The legislation is likely to pass and has been labeled a "high priority" on the legislative agenda,
likely as a result of a public interest litigation challenge filed by the Beacon Center of Tennessee
against the State Board of Cosmetology. Despite possible fixes to the law, the proposed changes
lend credence to the plea for judicial intervention: although the lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the licensing did not reach the point of final judgment, the mere possibility of
an adverse judgment and the accompanying negative publicity galvanized the Tennessee
legislature to finally consider addressing this issue.
257. See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 12-13, 17. But see Hearing on H.B. 745 Before the H. Health
& Human Res. Comm., 1995 Leg., 99th Sess. (Tenn. Apr. 11, 1995) (transcript on file with author)
(statement of Rep. Cantrell) ("From previous discussions, we kind of heard that if a grandmother
down the road shampoos a neighbor's hair, then the cosmetologists aren't going to like that.").
258. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 106 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J.,
concurring) ("As Nobel economist Milton Friedman observed, 'the justification' for licensing is
always to protect the public, but 'the reason' for licensing is shown by observing who pushes for
it-usually those representing not consumers but vested, already-licensed practitioners." (citing
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 240 (1980))).
259. The author acknowledges that certain licenses bearing an arguably less tenuous
connection to protecting public health or consumer safety would have a more delicate balancing
analysis. However, the example of the shampoo technician license highlights the ease with which
a reviewing court may conduct the judicial engagement/Whole Woman's Health analysis for
particularly absurd licensing requirements.
260. See Koppelman, supra note 212, at 1069 (discussing the limits of judicial deference in
light of the concern of judicial policymaking).
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the decision has an improper purpose."261 And analogous to animus, the
Court has the capacity to uncover potential improper purposes, like
naked economic protectionism.
On the "burden" side of the equation, there is the initial cost of
the shampoo technician license itself, along with the biennial renewal
fee.2 6 2 However, before an applicant may even register to take the $140
two-part exam (a practical exam and a theory of shampooing exam),263
she must complete "300 hours in the practice and theory of shampooing
at a school of cosmetology."264 Unfortunately, not a single school in the
State of Tennessee offers such a shampoo technician curriculum.265
Instead, any applicant hoping to obtain a shampoo technician license
must acquire the broader cosmetologist license-requiring 1,500 hours
of training at a school of cosmetology,266 equivalent to more than nine
months of forty-hour work weeks.267 Tuition and other costs for such
cosmetology training can run upwards of $14,000 and take nearly a year
to complete. 268 Failure to comply with the shampoo training and
licensing requirements is a Class B misdemeanor, punishable by up to
six months in jail, 2 6 9 in addition to any civil penalties the Board of
Cosmetology chooses to impose.270
Turning to the inquiry regarding the purported benefits of the
law, three hundred hours of training would arguably improve the
quality of hair washing services, perhaps resulting in fewer instances
261. Id.
262. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-4-117(a) (2017).
263. BD. OF COSMETOLOGY & BARBER EXAMINERS, Examination Information, TENN. DEP'T
COM. & INS., https://www.tn.gov/commerce/article/cosmo-examination-information (last visited
July 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UCG8-JT2D].
264. § 62-4-110(e).
265. Nick Sibilla, Shampooing Hair Without a License Could Mean Jail Time in Tennessee,




267. This chain of logic, of course, assumes that the individual indeed possesses a strong
passion for shampooing and would not be dissuaded by such a large outlay of time and money.
268. See Cosmetology Program - Cosmetology Tuition, TENN. SCH. BEAUTY,
https://tennesseeschoolofbeauty.com/cosmetology-program/ (last visited July 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/ANU8-WBB7] (charging $14,995 for tuition for the forty-five-week cosmetology
course); Prospective Students: Cosmetology, FRANKLIN HAIR ACAD.,
http://franklinhairacademy.com/prospective-students/ (last visited July 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/95QR-JXYX] ($12,425 for tuition for a similar program).
269. See § 62-4-129(a) ("A violation of this chapter or any rules promulgated under this chapter
is a Class B misdemeanor."); see also § 40-35-111(2) (detailing authorized terms of imprisonment
and fines for various felonies and misdemeanors).
270. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0440-01-.14(1) (2015) (authorizing the Board to assess civil




of soap suds in clients' eyes.2 71 Additionally, shampoo trainees would
also likely gain broader knowledge about general sanitation procedures.
While these are certainly not unhelpful skills for hair shampooers to
have, the purported benefits must be considered in light of not only the
disproportionate cost of acquiring those skills-hundreds, if not
thousands of dollars and months of instruction-but also all of the other
skills that are not part of the shampoo technician license.272 That is not
to say that there are no public health benefits from three hundred hours
of training in the practice and theory of shampooing. However, the
benefit should be measured in relation to the cost of time and money
imposed on the individual.
Additionally, the potential for health and safety benefits must
be considered alongside the fact that a licensed cosmetology manager
must be present and supervising at all beauty salons in Tennessee,
which are themselves governed by a whole slew of other statutory safety
and sanitation requirements.2 7 3 These redundancies in regulations
further undermine the state's purported interest in safety or public
health. Comparing the benefits reaped from the law with the burdens
imposed by it suggests that passage of the licensing requirement may
have been motivated by an illegitimate purpose, perhaps naked
economic protectionism.
CONCLUSION
An awareness of the overwhelming breadth of occupational
licensing schemes and the potential downsides has entered the national
consciousness in recent years. Yet despite a myriad of attempts to
challenge these regimes as the impermissible product of naked
economic protectionism, no comprehensive solution has yet emerged.
Instead, a glaring divide has arisen amongst the federal appellate
courts regarding the legitimacy of the economic protectionism that so
frequently drives these regulations. To eliminate the current confusion,
the Supreme Court should review these licensing schemes using
rational basis-with-judicial-engagement. The Court has demonstrated
a willingness to engage in such analysis before, thereby weakening its
271. However, the Board of Cosmetology can point to no consumer complaints regarding
shampooing so horrific to be worthy of filing a complaint. See Sibilla, supra note 265 (referencing
a quote from the spokesman for the Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barber Examiners); see
also supra Section II.A. and notes 129-131.
272. Compare § 62-4-102(a)(22) (clarifying that, for purposes of licensing, shampooing means
only "brushing, combing, shampooing, rinsing or conditioning upon the hair and scalp"), with § 62-
4-102(a)(3) (including in the definition of cosmetology the comparatively riskier tasks of singeing,
bleaching, cutting, coloring, waxing, and using antiseptics, tonics, and depilatories).
273. §§ 62-4-118 to -125, -129.
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claims of incompetence in evaluating the motivations of lawmakers. In
order to avoid hindering the economic wellbeing of all Americans, the
Court should do its job in order to protect your right to do yours.
Nicole A. Weeks*
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., 2011, University of
Massachusetts-Boston. First and foremost, I thank Braden Boucek of the Beacon Center of
Tennessee for affording me the opportunity to work directly in this area of law and for his
thoughtful comments and suggestions along the way. I would also like to thank the editors and
staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their diligent, thorough work. And finally, I thank my
parents, Kenny & Cindy Weeks, for supporting me unconditionally in whatever I chose to do, even
if that meant moving all the way to Tennessee. Thank you for making this possible.
1700 [Vol. 70:5:1663
The Vanderbilt Law Review is published six times a year by the Vanderbilt Law Review,
Vanderbilt University Law School, Nashville, TN 37203-1181. Class "Periodicals" postage is paid at
Nashville, Tennessee, and at an additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, Davidson, TN 37203-
1181.
Web Page: http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org
Manuscripts: The Vanderbilt Law Review invites the submission of unsolicited Articles.





131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181.
En Banc: Vanderbilt Law Review invites all interested readers to submit short pieces for
publication in En Banc, Vanderbilt Law Review's online companion. En Banc offers professors,
practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law
Review. In addition, En Banc also considers comments, essays, and book reviews. For more information,
please see our web page.
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are $50.00 per volume (domestic) and $55.00 per volume
(international). Subscriptions commence with the January issue of each volume. All subscriptions are
continued for each succeeding volume unless subscribers provide timely notice of cancellation. Address
changes must be made at least six weeks before publication date. Subscription claims will be honored
one year from date of issue publication date. However, due to the excess cost of shipping overseas, if a
foreign subscriber's address is correctly entered on our mailing list, we cannot supply another issue for
that subscriber in the event it does not arrive.
Single and Back Issues: For back issues please inquire of: William S. Hein & Co., 1285 Main
St., Buffalo, NY 14209 (1-800-828-7571). The price is $20.00 per issue not including shipping and
handling. Back issues are also available in PDF format through HeinOnline at
http://www.heinonline.org. Single issues of the current volume are available for $20.00 per issue. Please
contact Faye Johnson at faye.johnson@law.vanderbilt.edu for further information.





131 21st Ave South
Nashville, Tennessee 37203-1181
e-mail: faye.johnson@law.vanderbilt.edu
Copyright: Unless otherwise specified, the Vanderbilt Law Review holds the exclusive
copyright to all articles appearing herein.
Antidiscrimination Policy: The Vanderbilt Law Review abides by the Vanderbilt University
Equal Opportunity Policy, available at http://www.vanderbilt.edulstudent-handbook/ university-
policies-and-regulations/#equal-opportunity
The Vanderbilt Law Review supports robust and open academic discussions on all legal topics.
However, the viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent he views of Vanderbilt
Law School or its faculty, students, or staff.
Vanderbilt Law Review
(ISSN 0042-2533)






















































































J. MARIA GLOVER '07
WILLIAM T. MARKS'14
ANDREW R. GOULD '10






OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professor of Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the
University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs and Dean of the School of
Medicine
Steve Ertel, Vice Chancellor for Communications
Nathan Green, Interim Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellor for Investments and Chief Investment Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellor for Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellor for Information Technology
Tina L. Smith, Interim Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion
and Chief Diversity Officer
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellor for Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Chief Financial Officer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellor for University Affairs and Athletics;
Athletics Director; Professor of Law
LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
Chris Guthrie, Dean of the Law School; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor f
Law
Lisa Bressman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; David Daniels Allen
Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs; Clinical Professor of Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Professor of Law; Associate Dean & Director, Law
Library
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; Professor of Law
FACULTY
Brooke Ackerly, Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Professor of
Philosophy; Associate Professor fLaw; Affiliated Faculty, Women's and Gender
Studies; Principal Investigator, Global Feminisms Collaborative
Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies and Law;
Associate Professor of Religious Studies; Affiliated Associate Professor of Islamic
Studies and History; Professor of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of French, English and Jewish Studies; Professor of Law
Margaret M. Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise; Professor of Law
Lauren Benton, Dean, Vanderbilt University College of Arts and Science; Nelson 0
Tyron, Jr Chair in History; Professor Law
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James F. Blumstein, University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law &
Policy; Professor of Management; Owen Graduate School of Management;
Director, Vanderbilt Health Policy Center
C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practice of Law
Jon Bruce, Professor of Law Emeritus
Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Professor of Economics; Professor of Law; Professor of
Health Policy; Professor of Leadership, Policy and Organization
Edward K. Cheng, Professor of Law; FedEx Research Professor for 2017-18
William Christie, Frances Hampton Currey Professor of Management in Finance;
Professor of Law
Ellen Wright Clayton, Craig- Weaver Chair in Pediatrics; Professor of Law; Professor
of Health Policy
Mark Cohen, Justin Potter Professor of American Competitive Enterprise; Professor of
Law; University Fellow, Resources for the Future
Robert Covington, Professor of Law Emeritus
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics; Professor of
Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professor in the Humanities; Professor of Law
Paul H. Edelman, Professor of Mathematics; Professor of Law
Joseph Fishman, Assistant Professor of Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus; Professor of History
Emeritus; Lecturer in Law
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey E. George, Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law & Liberty;
Professor of Political Science; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation & Dispute
Resolution Program; Professor of Law
Daniel J. Gervais, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of French; Director,
Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program Director, LL.M. Program; Professor of
Law
Leor Halevi, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair; Professor of Law and Economics; Co-
Director, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alex J. Hurder, Clinical Professor of Law
Sarah Igo, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Owen D. Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professor of Biological
Sciences; Director, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and
Neuroscience; Professor of Law
Allaire Karzon, Professor of Law Emerita
Nancy J. King, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard G. Maxwell Professor of Law,
UCLA Law School
Craig Lewis, Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance; Professor of Law
David Lewis, Chair of the Department of Political Science; William R. Kenan, Jr.
Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professor of Law Emeritus
Terry A. Maroney, Professor of Law; Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society;
Chancellor Faculty Fellow; 2016-17Andrew W Mellon Foundation Fellowship at
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University;
Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professor of Law Emeritus
Larry May, W. Alton Chair of Philosophy; Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professor of Law
Holly McCammon, Professor of Sociology; Professor of Human and Organization
Development; Professor of Law
Karla McKanders, Clinical Professor of Law
Thomas McCoy, Professor of Law Emeritus
Thomas McGinn, Professor of History; Professor of Law
Timothy Meyer, Professor of Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly I. Moran, Professor of Law; Professor of Sociology
Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law; Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice
Program
Robert S. Reder, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley &
McCloy (Retired)
Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics; Professor of Law
Philip Morgan Ricks, Professor of Law
Amanda M. Rose, Professor of Law
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
James Rossi, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law
and Government
Edward L. Rubin, University Professor of Law and Political Science
John B. Ruhi, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Director, Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director, Energy, Environment,
and Land Use Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professor of Law
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Centennial Professor of Law
Sean B. Seymore, Professor of Law; Professor of Chemistry
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Tarkington Chair of Teaching Excellence; Professor of Law;
Professor of History; Chancellor Faculty Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett
Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Education; Assistant Professor of Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Assistant Professor of Law
Ganesh N. Sitaraman, Professor of Law
Paige Marta Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director,
Criminal Justice Program; Affiliate Professor of Psychiatry
Kevin Stack, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Director of Graduate Studies, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Carol Swain, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professor of Law; Director, Legal Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law &
Business Program; Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of
Management
R. Lawrence Van Horn, Associate Professor of Management (Economics); Associate
Professor of Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael P. Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Director,
Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and Land
Use Program Professor of Law
W. Kip Viscusi, University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and
Management; Co-Director, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alan Wiseman, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in International Law; Professor of Law;
Director, International Legal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Professor of Law; Enterprise Scholar for 2017-19; Faculty, Co-Director,
LL.M. Program
Lawrence Ahern III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir Capital Management
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
& Flom (Retired)
Andrea Alexander, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Samar Ali, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Bass Berry & Sims
Roger Alsup, Instructor in Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructor in Law
Raquel Bellamy, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Bone McAllister Norton
Gordon Bonnyman, Adjunct Professor of Law; Staff Attorney, Tennessee Justice Center
Kathryn (Kat) Booth, Instructor in Law
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Attorney, Environmental Law
Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law; Coordinator Program on Law &
Innovation; Inaugural Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management,
Lipscomb University
Judge Sheila Jones Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate,
Metropolitan Nashville
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christopher Coleman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle
District of Tennessee
Hans De Wulf, Visiting Professor of Law; Professor, Financial Law Institute,
University of Ghent, Belgium
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professor of Law
Patricia Eastwood, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Corporate Counsel, Caterpillar
Financial Services Corporation
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
William Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Jones Hawkins & Farmer
Carolyn Floyd, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professor of Law; District Attorney General, 20th Judicial
District of Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware
Court of Chancery
Aubrey (Trey) Harwell, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kirsten Hildebrand, Instructor in Law
Darwin Hindman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme
Court
David L. Hudson, Adjunct Professor of Law
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-founder and Managing Director, Elixir
Capital Management
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of
Tennessee
Marc Jenkins, Adjunct Professor of Law; Director and Corporate Counsel, Asurion
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20th Judicial District
Michele Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Tennessee Justice
Center
Lydia Jones, Adjunct Professor of Law
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professor of Law; Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit
Andrew Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law,
UCLA Law School
Kelly Leventis, Instructor in Law
Jerry Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison
Will Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; General Counsel, FirstBank; Retired Board
Chair, Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation HCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professor of Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office
Robert McNela, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Liskow & Lewis
Bryan Metcalf, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Caitlin Moon, Adjunct Professor of Law; Founder and Legal Counsel, Ledger Law; Co-
founder and Chief Operating Officer, Legal Alignment
Kelly Murray, Instructor in Law
Francisco Miissnich, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa Mussnich &
Aragao Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Tennessee
William Norton III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner, Pickrell Law Group
Michael Polovich, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General
Mary Prince, Associate Director for Library Services; Lecturer in Law
Rahul Ranadive, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Carlton Fields
Eli Richardson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
John Ryder, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Harris Shelton Hanover Walsh
Deborah Schander, Associate Director for Public Services; Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York Capital
Management
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Teresa Sebastian, Adjunct Professor of Law
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professor of Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Middle District of Tennessee
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
Joseph Slights, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of
Chancery
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Judge Amul Thapar, Adjunct Professor of Law; Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger;
Member, Tennessee Board of Education
F. Mitchell Walker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer,
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
Margaret Williams, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Research Associate, Federal
Judicial Center
Thomas Wiseman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law
Group
Tyler Yarbro, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Dodson Parker Behm & Capparella
* **
